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The current intellectual property system by and large ignores so-called ―traditional 
knowledge.‖ Rooted in western notions of individualism, the intellectual property 
system concentrates almost exclusively on discrete new knowledge produced by a 
particular author or inventor. But a great deal of valuable knowledge does not fit this 
mould. Much of human knowledge ranging from folk music to technical know-how 
concerning the healing characteristics of a particular plant — results from communal 
rather than an individual effort. Such knowledge is not discrete and static, but instead 
evolves in response to the particular needs of a group or culture. Because of these 
characteristics and others, such traditional knowledge1 does not fit well within the 
current paradigm, and accordingly tends to be overlooked in discussions of 
intellectual property. 2 
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1
 Anyone attempting to discuss ―traditional knowledge‖ immediately faces the threshold issue of 
defining exactly what that term means. Fortunately, this article need not concern itself with a 
precise definition. It focuses more on the mode by which traditional knowledge would be 
protected, rather than the sorts of knowledge that might qualify for protection. Generally, this 
article refers to traditional knowledge as defined by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
in its ongoing discussions of traditional knowledge protection. The WIPO definition is functional 
rather than technical. It lists various characteristics that traditional knowledge tends to exhibit. 
See WIPO 2008(b) www.wipo.int [hereinafter "TK Draft Gap"]; WIPO 2008(a) www.wipo.int 
[hereinafter "TCE Draft Gap"]. Under the World Intellectual Property Organization (hereafter 
WIPO) definition, traditional knowledge is handed down from generation to generation, is held 
communally, and reflects a community's sense of cultural identity. Compare TK Draft Gap 4, at 
15 with TCE Draft Gap 4, at 8. 
2
 Actually, there are two distinct aspects to the traditional knowledge ―problem‖ in intellectual 
property. Intellectual property law tends to ignore traditional knowledge in two quite different 
ways. First, intellectual property protection has historically been unavailable to holders of 
traditional knowledge, either under the existing laws or a special regime. Second, legal systems 
have on occasion ignored pre-existing traditional knowledge when granting intellectual property 
rights. In a handful of highly-publicised cases, an individual author or inventor claims to have 
come up with something ―new,‖ when in fact the same knowledge has existed in a particular 
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During the past two decades, several nations have extended the umbrella of 
intellectual property law to cover traditional knowledge.3 In 2008, South Africa took a 
major step toward joining this group of nations. The Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2008 (hereinafter the ―Bill‖) would amend several of South Africa's 
intellectual property laws to afford protection to some forms of traditional knowledge. 
While the Bill deals mainly with traditional cultural expression such as performances, 
music, fabric designs, and visual art, and not with traditional technical knowledge 
such as medicines,4 it nevertheless represents a sea change in South Africa's 
approach to traditional knowledge. 
The Bill contains an intriguing mix of new and old ideas. Perhaps the most cutting-
edge aspect is the proposal that rights be administered by a national agency — the 
National Trust Fund for Traditional Intellectual Property — rather than in the cultures 
themselves.5 This trust-like relationship could, if properly executed, deal with some 
of the practical problems raised by any system of traditional knowledge rights.6 On 
                                                                                                                                                       
culture as traditional knowledge for centuries. In the most egregious cases, the knowledge was 
actually copied from the culture, perhaps with slight improvements. Two of the best-known 
cases are the patents for use of turmeric to heal wounds and for using the Neem tree as a 
fungicide, in the United States and Europe, respectively. What is often omitted from the story is 
that both patents were later held invalid for lack of invention. Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 76-77. This paper deals with only the 
first of these issues. While both issues are important, they involve very different considerations, 
and call for different resolutions. The second problem — the grant of intellectual property to 
someone who merely copies existing traditional knowledge — is the largely unintended 
consequence of quirks in various intellectual property laws, such as the rule in United States 
patent law that existing knowledge is ―prior art‖ only if it is recorded in a writing. 35 USC at 
paras 102(a) and (b). Given that much traditional knowledge is not written down, it may not 
prevent an inventor from obtaining a patent on the same idea. Because the problem stems 
largely from the way the rules are drafted, the second part of the traditional knowledge debate 
could be largely resolved by revising the statutes to ensure that existing traditional knowledge, 
in whatever form, bars someone from obtaining rights in the same knowledge. In fact, in this 
author's opinion, it would greatly help to reduce the confusion in the so-called ―traditional 
knowledge debate‖ if the two distinct issues were recognised as such and discussed 
separately. The WIPO proposals make significant progress in this regard, distinguishing 
between a ―negative right‖ to prevent others from obtaining rights and a separate right in the 
culture to obtain its own exclusive rights. 
3
 Several nations have adopted domestic schemes of protection for traditional knowledge. See 
eg WIPO 2003(a) www.wipo.int, 8 Compiled Laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan - a 406 
(unofficial translation); Guatemalan Penal Code - a 332A; Special System for the Collective 
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples Panama Law Act 20 of 2000; and Peru 
Traditional Knowledge Law No 27811 of 2002. 
4
 While the provisions dealing with trademarks and geographic indicators could apply to a mark 
used on medicine, the rights created by the provisions are trademark rights, not rights to the 
technology itself. 
5
 Bill clause 16 (adding new sections 40A, 40B, 40C, and 40D to the Copyright Act 98 of 1978). 
6
 Some of these problems are identified below at text accompanying notes 30 to 33. 
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the other hand, when it comes to the nature of the rights themselves, the Bill proves 
far less innovative. Rather than create a sui generis scheme like that employed by 
other nations, the Bill would essentially extend to traditional knowledge the existing 
protections set out in South Africa's current performers' rights, copyright, trademark, 
and design laws.7  
 
In this second respect, the Bill goes against the international trend. Early proposals 
for protecting traditional knowledge tended to try to bring that knowledge within the 
core intellectual property system, granting modified forms of patents and copyrights.8 
More recently, however, the trend has been to turn to other, non-property-based, 
modes of protection. This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the leading 
international project dealing with protection for traditional knowledge — the efforts of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization's Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. 
The recent proposals from this Committee eschew a property model of protection in 
lieu of a form of protection based on principles of unfair competition.9 The main 
impetus for this shift in direction was a consensus that the property model did not fit 
                                                 
7
  See hereafter the text accompanying notes 11 to 28. 
8
  Some of the national laws cited above in note 3 exhibit the essential features of a property-
based system. See a 9 of the Azerbaijani law (gives the state a right to prevent use of folklore 
by third parties when the work is distorted, or when no credit is given to the originating culture); 
a 332A of the Guatemalan law (limited to tangible cultural attributes such as artifacts); and a 15 
of the Panamanian Law (allows indigenous community to establish conditions for use and 
commercialisation). 
9
  The current WIPO proposals — which admittedly remain the subject of a fierce debate — are 
set out in two documents: WIPO 2006(b) www.wipo.int [hereinafter referred to as ―WIPO TK 
Proposals‖] and WIPO 2004 www.wipo.int [hereinafter referred to as "WIPO TCE Proposals"]. 
The WIPO proposals draw several distinctions between scientific/technical knowledge and 
cultural expression. For traditional technical knowledge, Article I of the substantive provisions 
provides, "Traditional knowledge shall be protected against misappropriation." WIPO TK 
Proposals 13, a I, § 1. The remainder of a I defines misappropriation, and includes acts 
involving "unfair or illicit means", § 2, and those that mutilate or distort the underlying 
knowledge, § 3(v). The provisions governing traditional cultural expression are similar, with one 
important exception. Aa 3(b) and 3(c) of the substantive provisions limits protection to situations 
involving wrongful acts such as failure to attribute or distortion. WIPO TCE Proposals 19-20. a 
3(a), however, does provide a form of property protection. If the traditional cultural expression is 
"of particular cultural or spiritual value or significance to a community", the proposals allow the 
culture to register it. Once the expression has been registered, the culture has the right to 
prevent all "reproduction, publication, adaptation, broadcasting, public performance, 
communication to the public, distribution, rental, making available to the public and fixation 
(including by still photography)" of the work. This broad right is similar to a property right like a 
copyright. 
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the unique situation of traditional knowledge.10  
 
This paper will explore whether property-based forms of protection like those set out 
in the Bill are a proper way to protect traditional knowledge. It deals with that issue at 
the higher — and admittedly more abstract — level of intellectual property policy. 
Resolving the threshold issue of whether property is an appropriate mode of 
protection is an essential first step in creating any system of protection. There are 
certainly a number of pragmatic problems with affording property rights in traditional 
knowledge. There may be ways to work around these problems, some of which are 
reflected in the Bill. However, if property rights contradict underlying policy, then 
there is no reason to develop a mechanism to deal with the day-to-day problems in 
administering a property rights system. 
 
Before beginning the discussion, it might be helpful to define what this paper means 
by a property right. The term ―property‖ has several different meanings in the law. As 
applied to the realm of human creation, however, property generally refers to a right 
to exclude others from deriving all or part of the value of a certain defined object. 
Thus, regardless of whether performance rights, copyrights, design rights, and 
trademarks are ―property‖ in some universal or technical sense of the word, they do 
give their owners a significant ability to exclude others. When this paper mentions 
property rights or a property model of protection, it is referring to any sort of legally 
enforceable right to exclude others from using or benefitting from the protected thing. 
Whether those rights are property in any other way really does not matter. 
 
The first part of the paper briefly demonstrates how the Bill generally incorporates 
and builds upon the existing property model, even though it makes several important 
modifications to that model for traditional knowledge. The second part discusses the 
typical objections to a property model for traditional knowledge, focusing especially 
on the arguments that the core justifications for intellectual property rights do not 
apply to this knowledge. The last part refutes these objections, demonstrating how 
                                                 
10
  See, eg, WIPO 2005 www.wipo.int . 88, 94, 135, and 147. 
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the standard arguments for when intellectual property rights are appropriate are both 
inaccurate and incomplete. The last part continues by demonstrating how, once all of 
the justifications for a property model are considered, a policy case can be made for 
granting property rights in traditional knowledge. 
 
To be clear at the outset, this paper does not advocate an intellectual property 
system for traditional knowledge. It is not meant as an endorsement of the Bill, which 
has its share of serious policy and technical flaws. The paper is instead agnostic on 
these issues. Its only purpose is to demonstrate that the common policy objections to 
using property rights do not stand up to criticism. However, even if a property rights 
regime makes sense as a matter of policy, there remain very real practical, 
administrative, and distributive justice problems with such a system. This paper 
makes no attempt to resolve these technical issues, and accordingly takes no 
position as to whether a fair and effective property rights regime can ever be 
implemented. 
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2 Property right aspects of the Bill 
 
As indicated above, the Bill would cover only certain forms of traditional cultural 
expression, including performances,11 copyrights,12 product designs,13 and 
trademarks.14 Traditional technical knowledge such as medical treatments and 
agricultural methods lie completely outside the Bill’s purview. In addition, rather than 
crafting a new form of protection, the Bill extends South Africa’s existing intellectual 
property regime, with certain modifications, to these expressions. If enacted, the Bill 
would amend the Performers’ Protection Act 11 of 1967, the Copyright Act 98 of 
1978, the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, and the Designs Act 195 of 1993, to include 
these traditional cultural expressions. 
 
Each of these four existing statutes employs a property-based mode of protection. 
However, the Bill alters how the basic property model applies to traditional 
knowledge. First, it changes how ownership is allocated. Ordinary copyrights, 
performers’ rights, design rights, and trademarks vest in the person (in some case, a 
legal person such as a corporation) responsible for originating the expression. Under 
the Bill, by contrast, the individual responsible for developing the expression has no 
rights. Instead, ownership of traditional design rights and trademarks vests in the 
indigenous community in which the expression originated.15 In the case of copyright, 
the Bill vests ownership in the National Trust Fund for Traditional Intellectual 
Property.16 While there is no explicit provision dealing with ownership of performance 
rights in traditional performances, the overall structure of the Bill’s performance 
provisions suggests that the Fund, rather than the indigenous community, also owns 
                                                 
11
 Bill clauses 1 to 4. 
12
 Bill clauses 5 to 16. 
13
 Bill clauses 27 to 36. 
14
 Bill clauses 17 to 26. The trademark provisions also deal with geographic indications. 
15
 Bill clause 19 (trademarks; the indigenous community has the right to register the mark); clause 
27 (designs; indigenous community defined as the ―proprietor‖ of the design). 
16
 Bill clause 11. The Bill defines the Trust Fund as a pool of money. Bill clause 16. Nowhere does 
the Bill give the fund any of the attributes of legal personhood. To this author — who is 
admittedly not well versed in the nuances of South African law — it is difficult to comprehend 
how a pool of money can own intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, this usage is consistent 
throughout the Bill. Several sections of the Bill contemplate the Fund taking acts with legal 
significance, such as negotiating royalty agreements. 
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these performance rights.17 
 
On the other hand, other aspects of the Bill make formal ―ownership‖ more a 
technicality than an issue of major practical import. Regardless of whether it owns 
the right, the Fund retains significant control over all four forms of protected 
expression. That control is most obvious in the case of copyrights and performance 
rights, where the Fund owns the right, and can make decisions as to how to 
commercialise the intellectual property. On the other hand, the Fund also retains 
significant control over designs and trademarks, notwithstanding that these rights are 
technically owned by the indigenous community. Although the indigenous community 
may own the right, any member of that indigenous community who receives a 
commercial benefit from using a design or mark must pay a license fee to the Fund 
rather than the community.18 In essence, the Fund manages those expressions on 
behalf of the community.19 
 
These license provisions represent a second, subtler way in which the Bill alters the 
ordinary intellectual property model as applied to traditional knowledge. Again, the 
linchpin of an intellectual property right is exclusivity. Reduced to its essence, an 
intellectual property right is the right to say no to another’s use of the property.20 In 
the case of traditional cultural expression, however, the Bill limits this basic right to 
say no. Consider the provisions discussed in the prior paragraph, which require a 
member of an indigenous community to pay a fee when she uses a design or 
trademark in a way that results in commercial gain.21 The Bill provides that this 
license fee will ordinarily be set in negotiations between the member and the Fund, 
or when applicable, collecting rights agencies.22 However, the Bill goes on to provide 
                                                 
17
 As discussed in more depth below, the Fund can command a royalty payment whenever 
anyone — including, apparently, a member of the originating community itself — receives a 
commercial benefit from performing a traditional performance. Bill clause 2. 
18
 Bill clause 22 (trademarks); clause 34 (designs). 
19
 In this regard it is also worth noting that any income earned by the Fund from managing 
traditional knowledge must be applied for the benefit of the indigenous community. 
20
 This ―right to say no‖ is, of course, subject to several limitations. The most common limitation is 
a compulsory license scheme, in which the rightholder must agree to license the intellectual 
property at a rate set by a neutral decisionmaker. 
21
 Bill clauses 22 and 34. 
22
 Bill clauses 2 (performances), 10 (copyright), 22 (trademarks), and 34 (designs). 
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that if the member and the Fund cannot agree, the license fee will be set by a court 
or in arbitration.23 The Bill’s copyright provisions employ a similar mechanism in the 
provision dealing with use by the originating indigenous culture of a copyright work 
owned by the Fund.24 In all three of these situations, the Bill converts what has been 
a ―property rule‖ — the ability to refuse to allow use, often enforceable by injunction 
— into a ―liability rule,‖ where a party may infringe provided she is willing to pay 
compensation.25 This switch from property to liability-based protection is even more 
extensive in the case of traditional performances. While the liability rules for 
copyright, design protection, and trademark apply mainly when the originating 
indigenous culture wants to use its expression,26 the performance provisions appear 
to adopt a liability rule for all uses of a traditional performance, including those where 
some third party outside the originating traditional cultural is involved.27 In essence, 
the Bill would completely abandon the property right model for traditional 
performances, and provide only a right to be compensated.28 
At least with respect to traditional works, designs, and trademarks, however, the Bill 
generally preserves the property model when dealing with infringement by third 
parties. Of course, in many respects it is easier to build on existing foundations, as 
opposed to crafting something new. But in the case of law, traditional doctrines do 
not always prove to be a good ―fit‖ for situations they were not designed to cover. 
The property model that applies in the field of intellectual property is based on 
certain foundational policies and principles. Because traditional knowledge differs in 
certain significant ways from other intellectual creations, these same policies and 
                                                 
23
 Bill clauses 2 (performances), 10 (copyright), 22 (trademarks), and 34 (designs). 
24
 Bill clause 10. Like the design and trademark provisions, this provision applies only when the 
community derives a commercial benefit from use of the work. If the use does not result in 
commercial benefit, the originating community may use the work for free. 
25
 These provisions somewhat resemble a compulsory licensing scheme. However, unlike a 
typical compulsory license, it appears that the rate can be set after the use has occurred. In 
those cases, the royalty operates more like an award of damages. 
26
 The design protection and trademark provisions also employ a liability rule in situations where a 
prior user — who may or may not be a member of the community — wants to continue using a 
mark or design that she used prior to enactment of the protections contemplated by the Bill. In 
such a case, the user may continue to use the mark or design, but on condition that he pay a 
royalty to the Fund. 
27
 Bill clause 2. 
28
 This liability rule is not necessarily objectionable. Some scholars have suggested that a liability 
rule is preferable to a property rule when traditional knowledge is involved. Reichman and 
Lewis ―Using Liability Rules‖ 337. See also Hilty 2009 IIC 886 (Hilty dubs these ―remuneration 
rights‖). 
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principles may not apply with equal force. The remainder of this paper will discuss 
whether a property model of protection — whether in the form contemplated by the 
Bill or some alternative — can be justified in the case of traditional knowledge. 
 
3 Objections to property rights in traditional knowledge 
 
South Africa is by no means alone in choosing to protect traditional knowledge within 
the existing intellectual property system. As noted in the Introduction, several of the 
early proposals for traditional knowledge attempted to provide protection by adapting 
intellectual property rights. Those attempts, however, immediately encountered a 
number of significant objections. A number of the more recent efforts, including 
WIPO’s ongoing discussion, have abandoned the property model in lieu of other 
approaches.29 On closer consideration, policymakers have determined that the 
property model simply does not work well for traditional knowledge. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the arguments against use of a property model can be classified 
into two groups: practical objections and policy objections. 
 
                                                 
29
 The WIPO proposals are cited above in note 9. 
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3.1 Practical objections to intellectual property rights 
 
The exclusive nature of property rights poses an immediate obstacle to any system 
of intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge. Who exactly would ―own‖ the 
underlying property right? In the case of other intellectual property rights, ownership 
usually vests in the person responsible for developing the invention or work. Given 
that traditional knowledge developed in a particular culture, it would by analogy stand 
to reason that the culture itself would own and control the property. But a ―culture,‖ 
unlike other legal fictions like a corporation or a nation, does not necessarily speak 
with a single voice. Determining who within the culture can make decisions 
concerning the property presents intractable difficulties. 
 
Similar issues stem from the nature of cultures. First, exactly what is a culture? 
Some cultures are self-defining, others are not. Even if a culture defines itself, its 
sociological boundaries may be far from clear. Moreover, a culture is not a static 
object. Cultures change over time. Further compounding the problem, cultures may 
split into subgroups, each proceeding along its own path. In the case of knowledge 
that may have been in existence for centuries, if not millennia, determining the 
―originating culture‖ can require herculean effort. Although traditional knowledge 
need not be ancient, some of the most valuable items of traditional knowledge have 
been around for centuries.30 
 
Finally, intellectual property rights also tend to differ from ordinary property rights in 
that they have a limited term. Most proposals for rights in traditional knowledge, 
however, either gloss over the term issue or presuppose protection for all time.31 
Should property rights in traditional knowledge be limited in time? If so, how would 
that time be measured? Given that much traditional knowledge is ancient, does it 
make sense to create rights now for those cultures? 
                                                 
30
 Not all traditional knowledge is ancient. Like cultures, traditional knowledge is evolutionary. Not 
only does prior knowledge continue to change and develop, but cultures also develop new 
knowledge over time. However, the older the knowledge is, the more difficult it is to assign it to 
a particular group that exists today. 
31
 For example, the WIPO proposals cited in note 9 do not specify a time limit for protection. 
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As noted in the Introduction, it is not the goal of this article to answer these serious 
questions. They nevertheless warrant mention, as they may ultimately prevent any 
regime of traditional knowledge protection — either property-based or otherwise — 
from proving workable. Moreover, due credit should be given to the proponents of 
the Bill for trying to deal with some of these concerns. For example, the decision to 
vest much of the control (if not outright ownership) in the National Trust Fund rather 
than in a ―culture‖ helps to alleviate some of the practical difficulties in identifying and 
granting rights to groups that are not clearly defined. Similarly, the Bill does provide 
for limited terms for many of the rights. Copyright, for example, is available only for 
those traditional works either created after the Bill takes effect, or within the fifty-year 
period preceding that effective date.32 The term would expire fifty years following the 
later of the effective date or the date the work was first made public with the authors’ 
consent.33 
 
3.2 Policy objections to property rights 
 
The other main category of objections to intellectual property rights in traditional 
knowledge is rooted not in pragmatism but instead in intellectual property policy. 
When the first intellectual property rights were granted, the rights were not seen as 
serving any particular social policy. Early intellectual property rights were often 
granted simply as a favour to someone who had pleased the government. Today, 
however, nations usually justify intellectual property rights as useful tools to improve 
the general lot of society. If a grant of exclusivity does not further these social goals, 
the argument goes, the grant is improper. Many of the current objections to the use 
of a property-based system for traditional knowledge assert that a grant of rights 
would run afoul of these fundamental policy concerns. 
 
Why do legal systems grant exclusive rights in inventions and expressive works? 
After all, unlike other forms of property, inventions and works are essentially ―public 
                                                 
32
 Bill clause 7. 
33
 Bill clause 7. 
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goods.‖ Unlike a parcel of land, a computer, or even an intangible like a bank 
account, an invention or work can be used by any number of people without 
diminishing the utility of the item to any single user.34 Granting exclusivity to any 
particular user, then, would deny many the benefits of this use without preventing 
any immediately ascertainable harm to the person with the exclusive right. 
 
Intellectual property rights exist because society also has various long-term goals. 
The standard argument involves what can be dubbed the ―reward for creativity‖ 
theory. True, any number of people can share a work or invention without diminishing 
the utility to any one person. However, one of those people — the author or inventor 
who came up with the work or invention — is in a sense ―special.‖ If not for the 
author's or inventor's creativity, there would be no work or invention to share — and 
society would, as a whole be worse off. 
 
This basic argument should be immediately familiar to anyone versed in the 
rudiments of intellectual property law and policy. The ―reward for creativity‖ theory is 
easily the leading policy justification for intellectual property rights.35 The theory 
actually has two main variants. Under the ―natural rights‖ view, the grant of a 
property right is society's reward to the innovator for his creative efforts.36 The other 
variation is the ―incentive‖ theory. Under this view, society gives the author or 
inventor a property right in her innovation not out of some vague sense of justice or 
natural right, but instead for a primarily economic reason; namely, as a financial 
incentive to encourage innovative activity. If the innovator has an exclusive right to 
                                                 
34
 Trademarks, however, are not public goods. If multiple sellers are allowed to use the same 
mark on similar goods, the value of the mark to each as a source identifier will decrease. 
35
 University of Colorado Fdn v American Cyanamid Co 105 FS2d 1164 (D Colo 2000) 
(―fundamental purpose‖ of the patent system is the ―promotion or real innovation in science and 
technology‖); Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law 1 ("The central argument justifying 
[intellectual property laws] is that the greater social welfare results where the ―natural balance‖ 
between imitation and innovation is disturbed to favour the latter."); Alikhan and Mashelkar 
Intellectual Property 4 ("The main objective of intellectual property rights protection is to 
encourage creative activity, thereby providing for the largest number of people, economically 
and speedily, the benefit of such activity."). For an extensive discussion of the theory from the 
European perspective, see Hilty 2009 IIC 888-890. 
36
 See, eg, European Union Directive 2004/48/EC (Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) 
Recital 2 ("The protection of intellectual property should allow the inventor or creator to derive a 
legitimate profit from his/her invention or creation."); Curtis Treatise on the Law of Copyright 17. 
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her innovation, she can profit from the sale of that innovation to others. The natural 
rights theory tends to dominate in continental Europe, and especially in copyright.37 
The incentive theory, by contrast, is more dominant in the Anglo-American nations, 
and is more frequently invoked in patent law.38 
 
For purposes of this paper, it is irrelevant whether the natural rights or incentive 
theory is the ―true‖ justification for intellectual property rights. Both variants share the 
same cornerstone. Under both theories, the reward is given to the innovator for the 
innovator's creativity. In other words, the author or innovator is rewarded as a direct 
result of his efforts in adding to the storehouse of human knowledge. 
 
It is extremely difficult to justify a system of property rights in traditional knowledge 
under the reward theory. The problem is not lack of creativity. Most traditional 
knowledge does involve the creation of something "new," at least when measured by 
the fairly low standard applicable to copyrights, designs, and other non-patent forms 
of protection. The problem is instead that the grant of exclusive rights does not 
provide the right sort of reward for that creativity. Much traditional knowledge has 
been in existence for centuries. The actual person or people responsible for 
originating that knowledge are often dead, and in most cases have been long 
forgotten.39 Even if the knowledge is of recent origin and the originator can be 
identified, most proposals for intellectual property in traditional knowledge would vest 
the rights not in the person but instead in that person's culture — or in the case of 
the Bill, sometimes in a national agency that simply owes fiduciary duties to the 
culture.40 In other words, property-based traditional knowledge laws give the reward 
to the wrong party. Regardless of whether the purpose of the property right is to 
                                                 
37
 See Petrusson ―Patents as Structural Capital‖ 363, 371 (discussing how only France historically 
viewed the patent as a true natural law right; other nations looked more to theories based on 
the inventor's labors and Lockean property theory). 
38
 Van Caenegem Intellectual Property Law 1; Alikhan and Mashelkar Intellectual Property 4. See 
also WIPO 2007 www.wipo.int (comments of Japan). 
39
 Hilty 2009 IIC 892-893; Gervais 2005 Mich St L Rev 141-42; Kuruk  2007 Pepp L Rev 629, 650-
51; Downes 2000 Colum J Envtl L 253, 258. 
40
 In some cases a culture itself could be considered the author or inventor of the traditional 
knowledge, especially when the knowledge is developed to address a particular cultural, rather 
than individual, concern. 
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reward past acts or to provide incentive for future acts, a system that grants rights to 
someone other than the originator would violate the basic policies of the prevailing 
reward theory. The grant of rights would be little more than a windfall to the 
recipient.41 
 
In one form or another, this argument has often been asserted against proposals to 
grant property rights in traditional knowledge. Instead, the argument continues, the 
only right the culture should have is the right to prevent wrongs directed at the 
culture itself, such as situations where someone acquires the knowledge by 
deceiving current members of the culture. However, the culture should not have a 
broad property right to "lock up" knowledge and thereby exclude all other potential 
users. 
 
                                                 
41
 The nature of the underlying creativity may also differ in the case of traditional knowledge, in a 
way that poses problems for the reward theory. The reward theory envisions an intended, 
discrete act of creation. Under this paradigm, there is a clear ―creative step‖ that distinguishes 
the creation from the prior state of knowledge; between the old and the new. Traditional 
knowledge, by contrast, usually does not involve a systematic act of creation. Rather, it evolves 
in bits and pieces as a reaction to the society’s cultural environment. Instead of the staircase 
paradigm underlying the reward theory, the evolution of traditional knowledge is often more of a 
ramp. 
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4 Rethinking intellectual property policy 
 
On their face, the policy arguments raised in opposition to property rights in 
traditional knowledge seem compelling — and have certainly proven compelling to 
many lawmakers involved with the question. Upon closer inspection, however, one 
can find certain flaws in the reward theory argument. First, the reward theory 
argument, in its most common form, often misstates the true justification for 
providing a reward. Second, the argument fails to consider that while the reward 
theory may be the most common justification for intellectual property rights, it is not 
the only justification. Each of these points will be addressed in turn. 
 
4.1 The standard "reward" argument misstates the underlying policy 
 
The reward theory, in its standard form, indicates that intellectual property rights are 
justified only as a reward for creative activity. In fact, however, even existing 
intellectual property systems focus on more than creativity. Consider copyright. The 
copyright system admittedly rewards only those who create. But consider the way in 
which the system rewards the author. The author’s reward — an exclusive right to 
disseminate the work — generally has value only if the author chooses to sell or 
otherwise distribute the work to the public.42 If society was concerned only with 
creativity, a simple cash prize or grant would work just as well. That society chooses 
to reward the author by providing the author a "commodity" in the work indicates that 
something other than mere creativity underlies the system. 
 
Consider also the conditions the existing intellectual property system places on the 
rightholder. While both patents and copyrights are exclusive rights, they have only a 
limited term. At the end of that term, the owner must dedicate the invention or work 
                                                 
42
 This observation admittedly does not always apply to patents. First, while a patent in a product 
will generally have value only if the inventor sells the product to others (or licenses the right to 
others to produce), a party can reap significant value from a process patent simply by using the 
process in its own operations. Second, the observation does not apply to the "blocking patent." 
If a party has patents in two competing technologies — Alpha and Beta — but licenses or uses 
only Alpha, its ability to prevent its competitors from using both Alpha and Beta gives it 
tremendous value in both, even though it neither uses nor licenses Beta. 
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to the public. The patent system imposes further conditions on the grant of the right. 
In order to receive a patent, the inventor must disclose the essence of the invention 
to the public in the patent application.43  Again, if the only concern were creativity, the 
law would not necessarily require the rightholder to educate the public or give up her 
rights at some fixed date. 
 
These features of the system help illustrate that society is concerned not only with 
creation, but also with dissemination: making sure that knowledge of — and 
ultimately the benefit of — the invention or work is made available to the public. 
Consider the following statement from the United States Supreme Court, in a case 
involving the patent laws: 
 
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure 
of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the 
invention once the patent expires.44 
 
A number of other real-world examples illustrate the importance of dissemination. 
Government invests heavily in the dissemination of knowledge. For example, most 
developed nations have established a public education system. Government may 
also encourage dissemination through libraries, publications, and other forms of 
education, today including the internet. 
 
In fact, from society's perspective, dissemination is just as important as creativity. 
While new knowledge can be beneficial, it is of little use to society if it remains 
locked up in the hands of the person who developed it. While the goal of 
dissemination is often omitted from the reward theory argument, it is in fact a crucial 
reason why nations opt for an intellectual property system rather than a system of 
patronage.  
                                                 
43
 A few nations, including the United States, also require the inventor to disclose the "best mode" 
of practicing the invention. This requirement provides the public with additional information 
about the invention. 
44
  Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co 440 U.S. 257 (1979) 262. For similar sentiment, see 
European Union Directive 2004/48/EC (Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights), recital 4. 
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Acknowledging the importance of dissemination also helps put the intellectual 
property system into a new light. Note that society’s interest in dissemination is not 
limited to new knowledge. In many cases, such as public education and government 
publications, the knowledge being disseminated is neither new nor creative. Instead, 
it is information deemed necessary for a well-educated population. When old but 
useful ideas are not widely known, providing a means of spreading those still-valid 
ideas can prove of significant benefit to the public. 
 
Property rights can actually provide an incentive for the dissemination of old, but not 
widely known, knowledge. At first glance, that premise may seem counterintuitive. 
How could "locking up" knowledge in one person or group ever help dissemination? 
The key to the puzzle lies in the economic notion of "transaction costs." The transfer 
of knowledge is not a cost-free endeavour. Depending on the complexity, it can 
involve considerable time and expense by the person who seeks to transfer the 
knowledge. Thus, absent a way to demand payment, the holder of knowledge may 
not have sufficient incentive to transfer the information to others. 
 
Property rights give the owner the tools to demand payment. As discussed earlier, 
intellectual property rights serve to commodify the underlying knowledge, allowing 
the holder to sell or lease it to others. An important feature of the intellectual property 
system is that the owner can ordinarily realise this profit only if she sells or licenses 
the protected idea to others. In the case of information that is not widely know — 
both new and old — a property right could encourage greater spread of the 
underlying information, resulting in gain to the culture. 
 
Traditional knowledge is a good example of ―old‖45 knowledge that is not widely 
known. Because traditional knowledge originates in a particular culture, it may be 
known only by the members of that culture. And yet, in many cases that knowledge 
could prove a boon to many others. Thus, a nation has an interest in encouraging 
                                                 
45
 Again, it should be stressed that traditional knowledge is not necessarily old. 
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dissemination of traditional knowledge. A system of intellectual property rights could 
held provide this encouragement. 
 
Of course, granting property rights in traditional knowledge does not guarantee 
greater dissemination. Many cultures jealously guard their traditional knowledge. 
Especially when folk or sacred expressions are involved, a culture's first inclination 
may be to prevent anyone outside the culture from using the protected knowledge.46 
In these cases, not only will property rights not provide enough incentive for 
dissemination, they may actually provide the culture with the legal means to lock up 
the knowledge within the culture. Commodification could also lead to internal strife in 
the culture, as certain members might be inclined to defy the group decision and sell 
the idea to outsiders.47 
 
4.2 Other justifications for property rights 
 
The reward theory, properly construed, certainly provides strong support for a 
system of intellectual property rights. It is a mistake, however, to assume that it is the 
only justification for such rights. In fact, some intellectual property rights serve goals 
that are only loosely related to the dissemination of knowledge. 
 
Consider trademarks. Trademark law gives one seller a property right48 in a word or 
                                                 
46
 Harding 1999 Ariz St LJ 291, 313-14, Hilty 2009 IIC 909. 
47
 Professor Yu's recent work, for example, hypothesises a "family feud" within a particular culture, 
in which different segments of the society disagree on what to do with the traditional 
knowledge.  Yu 2008 Temp L Rev 443, 490-91. Given these potential problems, a system of 
property rights might be more effective in encouraging dissemination of traditional technical 
knowledge — eg medicines and agricultural methods — than for cultural expressions such as 
folklore and dance. Although a culture might have deep-seated objections to sharing any type 
of traditional knowledge, there are likely to be fewer objections in the case of traditional 
medicines and agricultural methods than when folk music, song, dance, or art are involved. In 
the case of technical knowledge, it is more likely that the culture's main concern is ensuring that 
it is compensated when the knowledge is used, something that a property-based system could 
help ensure. Moreover, because some technical knowledge can be used by a large number of 
people to solve serious real-life problems, the demand — and accordingly the price — that can 
be commanded for such knowledge is likely to be higher, resulting in greater dissemination. 
Conversely, both the demand for, and the culture's willingness to share, its traditional cultural 
expressions will often be lower, meaning that dissemination may not occur. 
48
 In the case of a trademark, the right to exclude is not absolute. Historically, trademark law 
allowed one seller to exclude another only when the other’s use led to customer confusion. 
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symbol used in connection with a good or service.  In many cases this property right 
is quite valuable. Consumers prefer branded goods because they can make use of 
external knowledge when evaluating those goods in the market. Consumers assume 
that similar goods sold under the same mark will be of similar quality. Therefore, 
when they encounter a mark, they can tap into their own prior experiences with, or 
the recommendations of others concerning, goods sold under the mark. In this 
fashion, trademark protection allows a seller to reap the benefits of its reputation or 
goodwill. 
 
Applying the reward theory to this well-established intellectual property right, 
however, creates problems. Although it is admittedly possible to justify trademark 
rights as a reward for creative activity,49 rewarding creativity is not the only, or even 
the primary, goal of trademark law. Instead, trademark law exists to benefit and 
protect both consumers and competitors by regulating a certain type of deceit in the 
market. The grant of a property right to one competitor in a given mark "deputizes" 
that competitor, giving it both the right and the economic incentive to police the 
market for misleading uses of the mark by others. 
 
Other forms of intellectual property serve different goals. Moral rights help preserve 
an author’s reputation. The right of publicity functions much like a patent or 
copyright, but also reflects underlying privacy and personality concerns.50 
Performance and broadcasting rights exist to ensure fair behaviour in the 
dissemination of ideas. Although those who benefit from these protections typically 
have come up with something new, legal protection exists not so much as a reward 
for the creation, but to further other social policies. 
                                                                                                                                                       
However, this limitation on the right to exclude does not mean that a trademark is not a property 
right for the purposes of this article. As discussed above, this article uses ―property‖ to describe 
any legal right that limits the use of an identifiable thing to one person or a select group. 
49
 In some cases, the mark is a newly-coined word or symbol such as XEROX. Coining a new 
mark certainly involves a minimal level of creativity. In many other cases, the seller borrows an 
existing word as its mark. Nevertheless, in one sense even borrowing an existing word involves 
creativity. In these cases, using a mark in connection with a good or service creates a new 
meaning for the existing word or symbol. Instead of the old dictionary meaning, the word, at 
least when viewed in connection with the good or service, now connotes the seller’s goodwill. 
50
 See the discussion in Athans v Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd (1977) 17 OR (2d) 425 (Ont 
HCJ), one of Canada’s early, and most influential, right of publicity cases. 
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In short, the reward theory does not stand alone. There are a number of reasons 
why societies choose to vest one person or a group of people with exclusive control 
over the use or communication of knowledge. Acknowledging these other goals in no 
way diminishes the importance of rewarding the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. It merely demonstrates that the reward theory is not the only goal that 
justifies property rights. 
 
Any number of policy arguments could potentially be invoked to justify intellectual 
property rights in traditional knowledge. However, many of these arguments are fairly 
weak. For example, one obvious argument for property rights is that such rights 
could help redistribute wealth to the holders of such knowledge, as those outside the 
society would now be forced to pay or otherwise provide value to utilise the 
knowledge. Indeed, there is a strong sense of redistributive justice underlying the 
South African Bill. However, while redistribution of wealth may be a laudable goal, it 
does not justify a grant of property rights in traditional knowledge. A system of 
property rights would redistribute wealth in an uneven and somewhat haphazard way 
to different holders of traditional knowledge, as it would turn on the demand for that 
particular culture’s knowledge. Such a system could also create incentives for 
inefficient use of resources, including advertising and marketing expenses, by 
cultures seeking to capitalise on their new commodity. If income redistribution is the 
goal, a more efficient and equitable means would be a direct cash transfer or a 
change in tax structure, not a grant of intellectual property rights. 
 
Another possible argument for property rights in traditional knowledge is that such 
rights would rectify a basic imbalance in the international intellectual property 
system. This argument is sometimes called ―evening the playing field.‖51 Existing 
intellectual property treaties like the Paris and Berne Conventions and TRIPS 
obligate nations to provide intellectual property rights to certain inventions and 
expressions, regardless of where they originated.52 Given that most patented 
                                                 
51
 WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF.4 at 5. 
52
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; Berne Convention for the Protection 
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inventions and copyrighted expressions originate in industrialised nations, the 
current system tends to benefit those wealthier nations at the expense of the 
developing and least-developed nations. On the other hand, while these less 
developed nations may be ―intellectual property poor,‖ many are rich in resources 
that are not protected by current intellectual property law, including biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge.53 Commodifying these resources, the argument goes, would 
help these nations to ―participate more effectively in global markets.‖54 
 
However, at its core this argument is merely a variation on the income redistribution 
argument. Intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge would, of course, 
increase the wealth of certain nations or cultures, and may (or may not) tend to 
benefit the lesser developed nations. But so would a grant of property rights in other 
freely-shared resources, including airspace and shipping lanes. Few would argue 
that granting property rights in airspace and shipping lanes is a useful way to 
augment a nation's wealth. Similarly, unless there is another reason to grant rights in 
traditional knowledge, the underlying goal of income redistribution could be better 
achieved in other ways. 
 
On the other hand, there are more convincing arguments favouring property rights in 
traditional knowledge. Two are particularly persuasive. First, granting rights to the 
society that currently uses the knowledge could help prevent mistakes in either the 
use or teaching of the knowledge. Second, exclusive rights in traditional knowledge 
could be a means to help preserve the uniqueness — and possibly the very 
existence — of threatened cultures. 
 
4.2.1 Accuracy in the transmission and use of knowledge 
 
As discussed above, the property right in a trademark helps preserve the accuracy of 
knowledge conveyed in the marketplace. And in fact, legal systems often employ 
                                                                                                                                                       
of Literary and Artistic Works; Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). 
53
 WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF.4 at 5. 
54
 WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF.4 at 5 and 10. 
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exclusive rights as a means to limit errors in the transmission or use of knowledge. 
For example, the "tarnishment" branch of trademark dilution law allows the owner of 
a well-known mark to prevent others from using that mark in a way that would 
decrease the positive features of the goodwill the owner enjoys in that mark.55 
Second, the moral right of integrity allows an author to prevent others from distorting 
her work in cases where the distortion would harm the author's honour or 
reputation.56 Third, moving outside the world of intellectual property, numerous 
cultures and private organisations have rules that give one person the sole right to 
use or transmit knowledge, ranging from license requirements for those who 
dispense legal or medical knowledge to the practice in some cultures to having an 
exclusive speaker of folk stories or singer of traditional songs.57 All of these rules 
help prevent distortion of or mistakes in applying the underlying knowledge by 
excluding those who might distort the knowledge. Tarnishment-style dilution allows 
the mark owner to prevent others from introducing extraneous and false information 
that distorts the goodwill in the mark. The moral right of integrity similarly allows the 
author to protect her message by preventing changes that would distort her intended 
meaning.58 Training and license requirements ensure that only those who 
understand the knowledge or technology may use it. And social rules limiting 
recitation to one person ensure — if coupled with adequate training and other 
controls — that the recitation will be accurate and unaltered. 
 
By similar logic, it might be possible to justify giving a culture property rights in its 
traditional knowledge to help prevent inaccurate use or transmission of the 
knowledge.59 At first glance, the thought of government granting anyone exclusive 
rights in knowledge in order to prevent others from making what government deems 
                                                 
55
 In cases of dilution by ―blurring,‖ by contrast, the owner of the mark sues to prevent a decrease 
in the association between the mark and the good, not a change in the positive nature of that 
association. 
56
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works a 6bis. 
57
 See eg Howard 1983 Ethnomusicology 71-82; McAllester Perspectives of New Music 433-446. 
58
 The accuracy goal helps explain why the right is limited to those changes that affect honour or 
reputation. If a particular alteration is not associated with the original author, the author’s 
original message, as perceived by the public, remains unchanged. 
59
 The Azerbaijani law is especially concerned with distortion. See the 8 Compiled Laws of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan - aa 6.2 and 9.11. 
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a ―mistake‖ may seem anathema to a free society. Absent a grave threat to safety or 
morality, civilised government does not police the truth.  Limiting the transmission or 
use of information is the hallmark of a repressive government, not of a government 
that protects rights. 
 
And yet, the above examples illustrate that even democratic governments frequently 
grant exclusive rights in knowledge and expression in order to prevent mistakes. 
This limited government interference in the marketplace of ideas is considered 
acceptable for the simple reason that not all ―mistakes‖ involving knowledge or 
expression are of equal concern. Intervention is most likely when mistakes affect the 
natural environment or parties other than the owner. Trademark and false advertising 
law help prevent consumers from receiving false information in the market. Licensing 
and training requirements prevent those with inadequate knowledge from harming 
others. 
 
Governments may be more reluctant to interfere in situations where the mistake 
causes harm only to the owner of the information. For example, in many nations 
there is a perceived tension between allowing recovery for misstatements that harm 
reputation and the human right of free expression. Nevertheless, in some 
circumstances most nations will allow the owner to prevent mistakes in the spread of 
information even if there is no harm to others. 
 
The most difficult situation is where the only harm is to the information itself. Most 
governments have proven reluctant to give anyone the power to protect the 
knowledge itself. Instead, government typically opts for a system of Hegelian 
dialectic, in which all sides have a chance to join the debate, in the hope that the 
truth will ultimately prevail. Giving one side the exclusive right to transmit or use the 
information would inhibit this process, and put government in the uncomfortable 
position of squelching discussion. 
 
These observations are especially germane to the question of property rights in 
traditional knowledge. In many situations, a culture in possession of traditional 
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knowledge will best understand that knowledge. Giving that culture exclusive rights 
to that knowledge would help to prevent the distortions that might occur if the 
knowledge was used or conveyed by others with a less perfect understanding. In the 
case of traditional knowledge, however, property rights would be appropriate only 
when the distortion might cause external harm to the environment or some person – 
either to the culture that owns the knowledge, or a third party. For example, 
government could justifiably choose to limit the use of a traditional medical plant to 
those within the culture that developed the treatment. Property rights in this situation 
would help prevent harm to others. By the same token, government could limit the 
use of traditional agricultural methods to a culture to minimise environmental harm. 
 
Both of these examples involve traditional technical knowledge. It is more difficult to 
envision how errors in the use or transmission of traditional cultural expressions, like 
those protected in the Bill, could cause similar harm.  In most situations, the only 
harm is ―internal‖ — harm to the knowledge itself — in which case government 
intervention is unjustified. 
 
Nevertheless, external harm is possible even when expression is involved. To 
illustrate, consider a situation where a person inadequately versed in the nuances of 
a traditional song performs that song for others.  No physical harm results from the 
performance. Nor is any lasting emotional harm likely. Nevertheless, that 
performance may result in two related harms. First, the observers are in a sense 
harmed by being subjected to an erroneous performance. At the very least, their 
understanding of the song’s full message is inaccurate. More significantly, the 
performance may skew their view of the culture from which the song originated. The 
second possible harm is to the culture itself. If the distorted performance is 
associated with the culture, the culture’s reputation among outsiders may suffer. 
While these external harms could justify giving the culture an exclusive right to 
perform the song, neither presents a particularly compelling case for property rights. 
The harm to the observers and the culture could also be prevented by a disclosure 
requirement, in which the performer had to inform the observers that she was not 
trained in the culture. 
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In conclusion, then, the policy of preserving accuracy provides a weaker justification 
for property rights in traditional knowledge than does the policy of encouraging 
dissemination. Property rights would be justified only when the inaccuracy poses 
some threat of harm to people or the environment. Giving exclusive rights to protect 
information itself, by contrast, goes beyond the function of good government. 
Moreover, in many cases government might be able to prevent the harm by means 
other than a property right. 
 
4.2.2 Preserving knowledge, preserving culture 
 
Traditional knowledge is disappearing at an alarming rate.60 In many cases, 
traditional knowledge has been supplanted by outside knowledge. A culture’s youth 
is enamoured with pop music recordings from other cultures, and forgets the 
culture’s own songs. Modern agricultural methods prove cheaper than the labour-
intensive traditional ways, leading to abandonment of centuries-old knowledge. As 
this traditional knowledge disappears, the world loses information and expression. 
Therefore, one argument sometimes set forth for legal protection of traditional 
knowledge is that legal protection would help to slow this steady loss of knowledge. 
 
However, loss of knowledge is not in and of itself an adequate reason to grant 
property rights. First, granting property rights in traditional knowledge provides no 
guarantee that people will not continue to abandon and forget that knowledge. 
Granting property rights in folk music or farming methods will be of little help if 
people truly prefer the recorded music or modern agricultural technology. 
 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, traditional knowledge and expression is by 
no means the only knowledge that is threatened with extinction. A high percentage of 
the world’s technical know-how and expression will eventually be lost. Much of that 
knowledge and expression is not recorded. Even if preserved in tangible form (a 
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 Hilty 2009 IIC 901; Downes 2000 Colum J Envtl L 255. 
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luxury admittedly not enjoyed by a great deal of traditional knowledge), much of it will 
never be referred to again. Given that all sorts of knowledge and expression are 
fading from our collective memory, there is no a priori reason to single out traditional 
knowledge for preservation. At best, the argument supports only an initiative to 
record and archive that knowledge. 
 
On the other hand, in some cases there is a crucial difference between traditional 
knowledge and other forms of knowledge and expression. Some traditional 
knowledge is crucial to a culture’s sense of identity. This phenomenon is perhaps 
most obvious with expressions such as sacred songs, stories, and art. But technical 
knowledge may also play a major role in a culture’s identity. Scientific knowledge 
such as agricultural methods can be an important aspect of the culture, establishing 
patterns and rituals that help define the group as a distinct culture.61 
 
Therefore, while preservation is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to provide 
property rights in all traditional knowledge, it is more compelling for that subset of 
knowledge which is essential to a culture’s sense of identity. In that case, the 
knowledge is not being preserved for its own sake, but instead because of the role it 
plays in preserving the culture to which it relates.62 In short, the justifiable goal is not 
preserving knowledge, but the broader goal of preserving culture itself. 
 
Preserving threatened cultures is undoubtedly a priority goal of international human 
rights law. The older policies of assimilating minority cultures have been rejected, 
replaced by a policy of maintaining the mosaic of different cultures and traditions.63 
One of the greatest threats to cultural diversity is the gradual loss of "non-
mainstream" cultures, especially those with relatively few members. International 
human rights organisations and NGOs have suggested a number of ways to stem 
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 Cross 2009 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 257-292. 
62
 WIPO 2001 www.wipo.int 117 (discusses how knowledge forms part of a "politics of memory"); 
Daes Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property 30. 
63
 The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, which encourages nations to adopt measures "for the protection and promotion of 
the diversity of cultural expressions on their territory," is in effect in almost one hundred nations. 
UN Doc CLT-2005/CONVENTION DIVERSITE-CULT REV. art 1(h). 
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the inexorable loss of cultures in the modern world. 
 
Unlike the extinction of a biological species, the loss of a culture rarely occurs simply 
because its members die out. A culture, after all, is a dynamic organism, and it is 
possible for individuals to join or leave. Because of this dynamic nature, loss of a 
culture more commonly occurs when the members no longer identify with the unique 
traits that define the culture. For example, international human rights law recognises 
the importance of allowing all cultures to preserve their languages and religions.64 
 
The pressing need to preserve non-mainstream cultures may also provide a policy 
justification to grant intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge.65 The 
effectiveness of a property regime, however, depends on how the culture’s self-
identifying knowledge is threatened. At the risk of oversimplification, this threat can 
occur in two ways. First, outside knowledge can supplant traditional knowledge. 
Second, just the opposite phenomenon can occur: those outside the culture can 
become so enamoured with traditional knowledge that they begin to use it. If the 
connection between the knowledge and a particular culture is diluted, that knowledge 
will cease to help the culture identify itself. In North America, for example, the ―New 
Age‖ movement, which involved non-Native Americans adopting various Native 
American practices, served to dissociate those practices from the original cultures. 
 
A grant of property rights most directly addresses the situation of ―dilution.‖ Property 
rights would give a culture the right to prevent others from employing the knowledge 
or relaying the expression, thereby slowing down the degree to which the traditional 
knowledge is adopted by members of other cultures. Property rights would be less 
effective in dealing with the threat of supplanting, which occurs when people in the 
protected culture are exposed to outside influences. A society's exclusive ownership 
of a particular song in no way gives it any greater authority to shut out "competing" 
                                                 
64
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), a 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976), aa 2(1) and 14. 
65
 Professor Hilty explores a variation on this theme, discussing whether any sort of property 
rights could provide an impetus for development in lesser-developed nations. Hilty 2009 IIC 
894-898. 
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songs from other cultures. At best, a grant of property rights might cause people to 
perceive of the traditional song as better, because government has elected to protect 
it, and because it is being sold at a price. 
 
Moreover, using cultural preservation as a justification for intellectual property rights 
in traditional knowledge also has its share of problems. The problems here are more 
serious than those accompanying the other two justifications. First, protecting culture 
requires a broader, more expansive property right than that needed to encourage 
dissemination or ensure accuracy. The first two goals can be achieved by granting a 
property right in the particular knowledge or expression. Modifications or variations of 
the idea need not be part of the intellectual property. Suppose, for example, that a 
culture knows a method to increase the yield of a particular crop. If government 
wanted to encourage dissemination of that method, it would only need to grant the 
culture an exclusive right to that method, not to other similar methods. Preserving 
culture, however, requires a property right not only in the cultural trait itself, but also 
in traits that are sufficiently similar to threaten the uniqueness of the trait itself. 
 
Second, a property right designed to preserve culture may directly contradict the 
policy of dissemination. The key to an intellectual property right designed to preserve 
culture is that it allows the owner to prevent others from using the traditional 
knowledge. Of course, government might deem it necessary to grant such a right in 
the case of a non-mainstream culture facing a significant threat. 
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Third, there are likely to be cases where more than one culture shares particular 
knowledge. That same traditional knowledge may help define both cultures. The 
obvious solution is to grant both cultures a sort of "joint" property right, applicable 
against the rest of the world. However, if the goal is to preserve culture, a joint 
property right could present problems. If one of the joint owners decides to allow 
outsiders to use the knowledge, its act may threaten the continued existence of the 
other culture, defeating the purpose of the property right. Thus, not only would a 
property right designed to protect culture need to be fairly broad, it might also need 
to be inalienable and non-waivable. 
 
Even with these problems, however, the goal of preserving culture can arguably 
justify a grant of property rights in traditional knowledge. The threat that increased 
exposure to other cultures poses is difficult to control. Government could opt to rein it 
in by direct intervention. However, a grant of intellectual property rights to the 
threatened culture is another option. Giving control to the culture itself allows the 
culture decide what aspects of its shared knowledge and expression are so crucial 
that they must be preserved solely for use by the members, and which can be 




At present, it is impossible to predict whether international law will ever develop a 
minimum standard for protecting traditional knowledge. Nevertheless, it seems a 
safe bet that any minimum standard which may be adopted will not involve property 
rights. Granting property rights to traditional knowledge raises a whole host of 
difficulties, ranging from practical concerns to deep-seated policy objections to 
property rights in a form of knowledge so different from ordinary patentable 
inventions or copyrightable works. 
 
This article has tackled one subset of the objections to a property system; namely, 
the argument that property rights in traditional knowledge would not satisfy the policy 
justifications for a grant of exclusive control in information and expressions. It 
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demonstrates that sound policy reasons do exist for granting cultures exclusive 
control over some of their traditional knowledge. Reaching this conclusion requires a 
close look at all the possible reasons for granting exclusivity, not merely the "reward 
for creativity" rationale that predominates in discussions of ordinary intellectual 
property. 
 
Finally, it warrants repeating that the purpose of this article is not to advocate for 
property rights in traditional knowledge. Its only aim is to demonstrate that the policy 
arguments often offered in opposition to traditional knowledge rights are not as 
compelling as they may seem at first glance. Even if the policy objections can be 
overcome, there remain a number of practical and fairness issues that would make it 
extremely difficult to craft a workable regime of traditional knowledge rights. The 
author's hope is that by helping remove the policy arguments from the debate, future 
discourse may focus on whether these many problems can be overcome. 
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